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Indian history has a thousand lessons to offer.  Two of them stand out—not counting the one that says that those who don’t know history are condemned to re-live it.  The first lesson is well-known: India is a tempting target for marauders of every kind.  The second is less known: India is never quite prepared to defend itself.  It is particularly slow at manufacturing weapons.  Even today it imports them, a whole lot of them, acquiring in the process the dubious distinction of being one of the biggest importers of weapons in the world—and creating, as a result, a host of problems for itself.

Rajesh Kumar seeks to cover the broad canvas of India’s most important bilateral relationship i.e., with the US, in this book which examines the politico-strategic relations between the two countries from the early years of India’s Independence to the present.The author starts off by studying the period between 1947-1984 and examines how relations between New Delhi and Washington evolved during this period. However, by way of introduction, the author gives definitions of foreign policy, national interest, etc., which might be of little interest to erudite readers though it would be useful to students

India-China relations, since Independence 1947/Liberation 1949, have swung between romance and rancour. Romanticism was based on our shared civilizational interactions; rancour on the contradictions that emerged from the hard-headed practicality of two Westphalia states pursuing their perceived national interests as they have evolved over the last seven decades plus.

Two and a half years after Chinese troops amassed and transgressed points on the Line of Actual Control with India, there isn’t a definitive answer on just why Beijing carried out its aggression. Is this about history and reclaiming areas that once belonged to Tibet? Or is it in line with China’s present day ‘hegemonism’ that External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar alluded to, of the sort seen with Taiwan and in the South China Sea? Are the PLA’s moves to occupy land claimed by India, laying down bunkers and rolling in vehicles and equipment tactical—aimed at stopping the Indian Army’s considerable advances on border infrastructure, roads, bridges and landing strips?

It would sound like a cliché to say that India and China share a long and disputed border, are neighbours by geography and are entangled with each other through a long historical and civilizational connection. History and geography are the two prominent catalysts which dictate the direction of this bilateral relationship, a relationship which is very pertinent today for peace and stability in Asia as well as the world. India and China are today strong economic and military powers, and the existing conflicts make the situation highly tense. These are the facts which are known and often repeated.

Bhasin’s much celebrated book Nehru, Tibet and China is an exceptionally enlightening volume because it draws its methodology from basic rules of historiography. Among the numerous books available on the subject over the years and the attention it has garnered recently after the latest clash in Galwan, it is no less than a tremendous feat, that yet another piece has been attempted that not only places the historicity of the context, genesis of the dispute and furnishes a rather honest, at times, stark portrayal of the failure of Nehru’s China policy without the commonplace bitterness from Nehru’s detractors.