Wars generate a spate of books on tactical doctrine. Chaim Herzog’s book adds to the growing literature on the most important war in recent years, the Fourth Arab-Israeli war of 1973: the war which commenced on the day of Yom Kippur, the Jewish day of mourning and atonement. Herzog’s credentials are impeccable. A former head of Israeli military intelligence, he is a military analyst: presently he represents Israel in the United Nations. Herzog would have us believe that the tactical thinking of both the Israelis and the Arabs was powerfully influenced by the Six Day War of 1967, and the subsequent War of Attrition during 1969 and 1970. The territories occupied by Israel gave her strategic depth; it also extended lines of communication. Some confusion of objectives was inevitable—political requirements dictated the need for establishing a perimeter defence against Arab attacks nibbling into the occupied territories; purely military logic dictated defence from defensible lines.
January 1976, volume 1, No 1