The year 2025 marked the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relations between India and China, the two modern nation-states. However, their familiarity with one another is older as two civilizational states with a shared border, history of visits and exchanges and cultural overlaps. In contrast, the last 75 years have been full of challenges, conflict and competition. The two neighbours have large populations and even larger strategic aspirations; they are the second and the fourth largest economies in the world and nuclear weapon states and thus there is even more reason to establish stability and predictability in the conduct of their exchanges. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his podcast with Lex Fridman in April 2025. Modi argued that there was no ‘real history of conflicts’ and ‘both nations have ancient cultures and civilizations. For centuries, India and China have learnt from each other and understood one another. Together they have always contributed to global good in some way. Old records suggest that at one point, India and China alone accounted for 50 per cent of GDP. That’s how massive India’s contribution was.’
However, the relationship in the last 75 years has been driven by mistrust and uncertainty. The initial bonhomie between the two neighbours marked by the slogans of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai was crushed by the 1962 war. After a freeze and no contact for almost 30 years the two sides resumed contacts after normalization of relations in 1988 which followed Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing. Though India and China have reiterated the need and necessity of resolving the border dispute for better relationship it is still elusive. Given the fragility of the border dispute and in order to mitigate any mishaps India and China had concluded a number of Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs). These CBMs did help the relationship and kept the border peaceful for almost four decades. However, the fragility of this peace was underscored by the Galwan clashes in June 2020.
The violent clashes at Galwan Valley in June 2020 occurred across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) after a gap of 45 years in which 20 Indian and 4 Chinese soldiers lost their lives. As a reaction to the violence, India decided to stop Chinese investments, ban a number of Chinese apps and also stop flights and other social and political engagements. New Delhi asserted that the banned apps were, ‘prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public order.’ India had also refused major investments from Chinese companies like BYD and had also added more scrutiny to such investments. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic further aggravated the negative sentiment against China.
However, after a freeze of four and a half years, 17 rounds of diplomatic talks and 21 rounds of corps commander level talks, the two sides finally reached a consensus. The two sides came to a patrolling agreement in October 2024 for Depsang and Demchok areas in Ladakh. As per the Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, ‘(India and China) reached an agreement on patrolling, and with that we have gone back to where the situation was in 2020 and we can say … the disengagement process with China has been completed.’ However, there is still a long way to go for de-escalation and demobilization. But this development did help in improving the relationship as it restared communication. In the words of Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi, ‘there has been a lot of change in the last year. From October 2024 to today, there has been a lot of improvement in our relations.’
China has continued to push for the idea of again following the path of people to people contact and normalization of economic relations. In the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, ‘Both sides have earnestly followed through on the important common understandings of our leaders, strengthened exchanges and practical cooperation at all levels, and achieved a series of positive outcomes. China and India are each other’s largest neighbours. China always believes that the two should be partners that contribute to each other’s success. A cooperative pas de deux of the dragon and the elephant is the only right choice for both sides.’ Wang Yi has also asserted that, ‘With each nation home to over 1.4 billion people, development should be the greatest common denominator between the two neighbors.’
On the other hand, New Delhi has been quite assertive about resolving the border issue before moving forward in other aspects of the any concrete positive development in the relations. Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had even asserted that India-China relations are ‘not normal’. He argued, ‘I think it is common sense that if there is no peace and tranquillity in the border, how can you have a normal relationship?’ Though post October 2024, New Delhi has also expedited the process of people to people contact.
These statements clearly show that even after years of talking, the two sides have continued to misunderstand each other. The October 2024 decision on patrolling has led to a lot of push for restoring people to people contact and a lot has been achieved on this front too. The two sides have resumed the Kailash Mansarover Yatra in June 2025. Connectivity is back in focus and both India and China have restarted the issue of visas to business people, students as well as tourists. The air connectivity has also been restarted. The first direct flights started in October 2025 with more flights following. The Indian Government stated that this will ‘facilitate people-to-people contact’ while also encouraging ‘the gradual normalisation of bilateral exchanges’.
However, the primary question which remains and looms large in this bilateral relationship is the lack of mutual trust. In addition, even after 75 years of diplomatic relationship and the recent push to reinstate and encourage ‘people to people’ contact the fundamental challenges in this relationship continue to remain unresolved. India and China have held 24 rounds of Special Representative (SR) Meetings for resolution of the border dispute. The SR mechanisms were put in place in 2003. However, even after 22 years not much has been achieved in the form of ‘final’ resolution on the border. Both sides have been talking at multiple levels and the leadership has also continued to meet regularly; however, even today the two nations genuinely do not understand each other. The last prominent meeting was in August 2025 when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Cooperation (SCO). Prior to that both the leaders had met in October 2024 in Kazan.
The recent developments can be regarded as a case in point. Though New Delhi continues to push for border resolution, Beijing has continued to reiterate people to people contact and economic connectivity. The two sides have continued to have a strong economic relationship, despite the border dispute and other challenges. The bilateral trade today stands at about 128 billion dollars with India facing a trade deficit of 99 billion dollars. However, the Galwan clash did underscore the fragility of peace based on economic relationship.
It would not be naïve to say that even after years of trade and connectivity, it is territory, sovereignty and nationalism that continue to drive the narrative. However much China harps on building trust through contact, the need for urgent resolution of the border is quite apparent. One cannot ignore the recent incident in which an Indian woman from Arunachal Pradesh, who was travelling to Japan via China was harassed at Shanghai airport as the Chinese officials claimed her passport was invalid, as Arunachal Pradesh is technically a part of China. The unresolved border has the capacity to derail this relationship and it has become quite entrenched in the rise of nationalism across the LAC.
For China the border appears to be an afterthought, given the military, infrastructure and technological advantage which it possesses. Beijing’s Defence budget stands at 250 billion dollars while India’s is at 79 billion dollars. China today also has a very advanced and modernized army and has the largest navy in the world. It has also made unparallel advances in space and cyber technologies. Today, Beijing is focused on equipping its military with better weapons and technologies. It has also undertaken massive infrastructure growth across the LAC which makes the movement of troops and equipments faster and easier.
These have complemented the perception change within the Chinese leadership, especially under Xi Jinping. Xi has completely abandoned the Deng Xiaoping dictum of ‘hide your strength, and bide your time’. He is too focused on showcasing and flexing Chinese strength and power. China has also continued to be increasingly aggressive under Xi and the goal of ‘national rejuvenation’ does not provide any room for compromise. These factors underscore the power and perception gap between the two sides. China also has global ambitions and craves respect, which a compromise on border with India will hinder. On the other hand, for New Delhi, border resolution is central to restoring trust and confidence in the bilateral relationship.
An analysis of the status of the India-China relations underscores the idea that the two countries are stuck in a loop, where they both are talking but not listening and most of the decision making is coloured by mistrust. The economic and military gap between the neighbours has increased and they are also facing new geopolitical, regional and domestic political scenarios.
Cooperation can definitely benefit the neighbours, however, there is a need to resolve the looming mistrust, and the only route available is a timely, acceptable and peaceful resolution of the disputed border.
Gunjan Singh is Associate Professor, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana.