Much opportunistic literature has been churned out on the emergence of Bangla Desh. Disappointingly, published material of relevance to a combatman or a keen student of military history has been restricted to some broad brushwork by people who were not quite near the scene of action, and written with the purpose of presenting a general over-view. This is surprising for a land campaign which involved three army corps and a communication zone headquarters, altogether comprising of a fighting complement of three divisions plus three brigades, not forgetting the Mukti Bahini. The actions were fought over a limited period of time, at an incredible speed over terrain that was easily defensible. With just a marginal superiority in force levels, the planning and direction had been thorough and imaginative, the execution based fully on flexibility and improvization. The results are all too well known.
A campaign fought with such success would be the easiest to write about and the effort would have been well received, particularly, when the lessons learnt and doctrines to recommend are many, and of great use to those who now repeatedly turn to foreign wars for precedents and examples.