This book has caused much controversy in the US because it deals with a theme that is sensitive. It is considered ‘politically incorrect’ to talk about the Israel Lobby and its influence on US foreign policy. But in a living democracy it should be possible, and often, it is unavoidable, to talk about what is considered ‘politically incorrect’. Mearsheimer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt is Professor of International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The genesis of the book is an interesting story. In 2002, the editors of the Atlantic Monthly invited the two authors to write an article on the Israel lobby and its effects on US foreign policy. It took almost three years to write and by 2005 it was sent to the editors who declined to publish it though the authors had taken the trouble to comply with the suggestions made by the editors. The authors tried other journals, but they too rejected it.
Finally, the London Review of Books published it in March 2006. The text of the article was put on the website of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and it was downloaded 275,000 times. Much encouraged, the authors decided to write a book in order to deal with the matter in a comprehensive manner. The authors have been accused of anti-Semitism.
Let us try to summarize the argument of the authors:
All the U.S. presidential candidates will agree on one point: deep personal commitment to Israel and strong determination to provide unyielding support for that state. Why is it there is such unanimity on this point? ‘In all affairs’, Bertrand Russell said, ‘it’s a healthy thing now and then to hang a question mark on the things you have long taken for granted.’ Two arguments have been advanced to explain the US support for Israel. One, it is an ‘indispensable partner’ in the ‘war on terror’. Two, it is the only country in the region that ‘shares our values’. Neither argument stands fair-minded scrutiny. Washington’s close relationship with Israel makes it harder, not easier, to fight terrorism and it undermines US’s standing with key allies in the region. As to the second argument, it is wrong to assert that Israel with its brutal treatment of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and its refusal to vacate the territories does share US’s values.
The real reason for the US policy towards Israel is the influence and reach of the Israel lobby. It is not a single, unified movement with a central leadership, and it certainly is not a cabal or conspiracy that ‘controls’ US foreign policy. It is a powerful interest group made up of both Jews and gentiles, whose acknowledged purpose is to influence US foreign policy in ways its members believe will benefit Israel. The lobby will not permit criticism of Israel by any US politician and it wants Israel to be treated as if it were the fifty-first state. When the Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson did endorse it, but did nothing much to advance the cause of the founding of a Jewish state. Based on his proposal, the Paris Conference dispatched a fact-finding mission headed by two Americans, Henry Churchill King and Charles Crane. The mission, noting the opposition of the local population, recommended against the establishment of a Jewish state. Since World War II, US policy was initially driven by oil, then by anti-Communism, and over time by its growing relationship with Israel. The shift towards Israel dates roughly from the 1967 Six-Day War. The supply of Soviet arms to various Arab states and the growing influence of the pro- Israeli groups gradually led to a dramatic transformation in the US policy in the Middle East. There was nothing inevitable or pre-determined about it.
Since the Six-Day War, for the past four decades, US has provided Israel with a level of diplomatic and material support that dwarfs what it provides to other countries. Israel now receives about $3 billion per annum, about 2% of Israel’s GDP. On a per capita basis it works out to $500 as compared to $20 for Egypt. Israel receives the entire amount as a special favour within 30 days of the fiscal year. This is like receiving one’s salary for the whole year in January. Israel is the only recipient that does not have to give an account of how the money is spent. Moreover, the total amount comes to $4.9 billion per annum if some other items not usually listed are included. One might imagine that such huge amounts of money given as aid, and the special terms, will give the donor considerable leverage and influence over the recipient. That is not the case. It is almost the other way round. To take one of the many occasions Israel has prevailed over US, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, President Bush began pushing Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to show restraint in the Occupied Territories and to do everything possible to contain the violence of the Second Intifada.
Bush put pressure on Sharon to permit Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to meet with Arafat. In early October (2001), Bush publicly advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state, the first time ever for a US president. Sharon reacted sharply, accusing Bush of trying to appease ‘the Arabs at our expense’. Israel, he warned, ‘will not be Czechoslovakia’. Hours after making these comments, Sharon sent the Israel Defence Forces to invade several Palestinian areas in Hebron. Bush personally met with Foreign Minister Peres and asked for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank where Israel had made a fresh incursion. Israel rejected the demand. The Guardian wrote that Ariel Sharon had ‘provoked the most bruising confrontation with Washington since George Bush came to power, flatly rejecting a demand to end an occupation of Palestinian lands that threatens the survival of Arafat.’ The subsequent un-folding of this drama is common knowledge.
The authors describe in detail the modus operandi of the Israel lobby and a good many of their arguments are convincing. But, at times, they exaggerate or even get facts wrong. For example, they assert (p. 245) that there is nothing in the public record ‘showing that Bush and Cheney were seriously contemplating war against Iraq before 9/11.’ Such an assertion shows lack of homework. It is well known that even before his inauguration Cheney had arranged for a briefing on Iraq for him at the Pentagon. This briefing was given on January 10, 2001, ten days before Bush moved into the White House. As the plans for an invasion of Iraq progressed, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned Bush (July 20, 2001) against the folly of such invasion. All this information is available in Bob Woodward’s Plan of Attack published in 2004. As we recognize the sterility of the big conference recently held at Annapolis, the first major effort by Bush to resolve the Israel-Palestinian dispute, we appreciate the essential validity of the thesis put forward by the authors. All those who want to understand the US policy towards the Middle East will find the book of absorbing interest.
K.P. Fabian, a former diplomat, is the author of Commensense on War on Iraq.