India-Sri Lanka Relations
Editorial
August 2022, volume 46, No 8

Mahatma Gandhi once referred to Sri Lanka as India’s ‘daughter state’. True to this metaphoric observation, India is not only Sri Lanka’s closest, but also an important and powerful neighbour in every aspect: territorial extent, population size, economic strength, military might and diplomatic standing. Relations between the two neighbours stretch to more than two millennia in wide-ranging areas—political, economic, socio-cultural and military. Common colonial experiences under Britain led both countries to have similar world views, yet certain strategic imperatives and national interests dictated differing policies, at times in conflict with each other. India has always stood by Sri Lanka in difficult times which is evident from India’s massive aid to alleviate the ongoing economic crisis witnessed by the Island state. The bilateral ties have in fact matured over a period of time and, in the present century, serve as a model of good neighbourly interaction. The state of relations between India and Sri Lanka since their Independence broadly falls into four distinct phases: pre-ethnic conflict, ethnic conflict—hands-on, ethnic conflict—hands-off, and post-ethnic conflict.

During the colonial period, the concept of ‘strategic unity’ between India and Sri Lanka emerged, as the British regarded the possession of Sri Lanka as imperative to the defence of India. Sri Lanka feared that India would retain the British imperial legacy in South Asia after Independence. The fear of a possible Indian domination after Britain’s departure prompted Sri Lanka to seek the protection of their former colonial master through a Defence Agreement and also to lay emphasis on the connection with the Commonwealth. Mindful of these apprehensions, Prime Minister Nehru took a highly accommodative approach despite his disappointments with the newly independent Sri Lankan leadership’s ‘limited world view’ and ‘rough’ handling of certain issues like sudden lay-off of Indian labourers in Colombo and de-enfranchisement of Indian Origin Tamils (IOTs). He avoided ‘speaking the language of threats’ and ‘tried to be friendly to them even when they have acted in an improper way.’ He firmly believed that if this fear was absent, Sri Lanka would be drawn towards India in due course. Thus, it was the ‘cautious optimism’ of Nehru that was responsible for keeping the ties from turning sour in the initial years.

When SWRD Bandaranaike became the Prime Minister in Sri Lanka in 1956, he relegated the Defence Agreement to paper and transformed Sri Lanka’s foreign policy from alignment to nonalignment. The fear of India’s domination went into oblivion, at least at the higher political level. His deep knowledge on world affairs, his ‘neutralist’ and socialist world view and emphasis on international cooperation and disarmament gelled very well with Nehru’s. As a result, personal relations and rapport especially between Bandaranaike and Nehru and later between Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Indira Gandhi came to dominate the diplomacy. This trend continued till late 1970s when a chunk of the bilateral issues and irritants were sorted out mostly by personal diplomacy that included two significant issues: status of Indian Origin Tamils, and demarcation of maritime boundary.

With the emergence of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka in the early 1980s, strains in bilateral relations surfaced that turned out to be the most difficult phase. India was caught in the ‘dilemma’ of finding a solution that met the sentiments and rights of the aggrieved Tamil community, but without affecting the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. The Tamil Nadu factor in New Delhi’s calculations also could not be ignored.

India tried its diplomatic skills in helping the two contending parties (the Sinhala majoritarian state and Tamil minorities) to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, but in vain. To bring an end to the violent ethnic conflict between the Tamil militants and Sri Lankan armed forces, India entered into an accord with Sri Lanka in July 1987 ‘to establish peace and normalcy’ in the Island. There was also a strategic consideration: to prevent the foothold of any extra-regional powers inimical to Indian interests in Sri Lanka. As part of the Accord, India sent its troops (Indian Peace Keeping Force—IPKF) to the Island. Though the Accord was hastily signed between the two governments, at that point of time, it had fair provisions acceptable to all parties of the conflict. The Agreement, however, faced difficulties from day one because of resistance from even some quarters of the Sri Lankan Government and most importantly the LTTE that rose up in arms against the Indian forces. The LTTE tried to rally the popular perceptions of the Sri Lankan Tamil community. However, the Accord was able to bring almost all non-LTTE Tamil militant groups to the political mainstream. And, most importantly, it could make the Sri Lankan Government devolve powers to the provinces, which were created by amending the Constitution (13th Amendment).

However, the ethnic violence took a new turn when the LTTE turned against the IPKF. Due to political compulsions both in India and Sri Lanka, India was forced to withdraw the IPKF in 1990. Though India maintained an informal ‘hands off policy’, post the withdrawal of the IPKF and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, it kept a keen watch on the developments in the Island. With the change of regime in Sri Lanka in the mid-1990s under Chandrika Kumaratunga, bilateral relations took a positive turn. India stayed away from any direct involvement in the ethnic question, but welcomed Norway’s efforts in facilitating the peace process. With the assumption of a new government in Colombo under Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005, and partly due to LTTE’s intransigence, the peace process started falling apart. Eelam War-IV commenced in 2006. Although India discouraged Colombo from exercising the war option, she did not restrain herself from providing ‘non-lethal’ military supplies to Sri Lanka, training of Sri Lankan security personnel, and sharing of crucial intelligence against the LTTE.

Despite ups and downs in relations on the ethnic issue, cooperation in economic and cultural fields improved tremendously during this phase. Economic relations especially received a big boost in 1998 with the signing of a bilateral Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement. In a few years, India and  Sri Lanka became each other’s largest trading partners in South Asia. India became the fourth largest investor in the island. The largest number of tourists was from India. This increased people-to-people contacts as well as resulting in enormous economic and social interests to sustain the relations.

Three main issues dominated the fourth phase: the ethnic question, the fishermen issue, and the China factor.

Ethnic Question: With the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, New Delhi’s broad concerns have been resettlement and development of post-war Sri Lanka and bringing a lasting political settlement of the ethnic issue. As the humanitarian situation unfolded in the immediate aftermath of ‘Eelam War IV’, India extended massive assistance to address the crisis. New Delhi also supported the revival of the local economy through a wide-ranging programme for agricultural renewal. Apart from genuine concern for the displaced, another motivation for the Indian assistance was to gain the lost goodwill of the Sri Lankan Tamil community. Realizing the importance of overall development of the Island, India has been extending credit to Sri Lanka, especially for infrastructure development. On the lasting political settlement of the ethnic issue, India’s consistent position has been in favour of ‘a politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights.’

Fishermen Issue: After the ethnic war, the fishermen issue witnessed different dynamics. The relaxation of fishing restrictions along the Sri Lankan coast led Sri Lankan fishermen to venture into the seas around. The Indian fishermen, who thus far had enjoyed monopoly of the resource-rich waters, got new competitors. This led to confrontations between the two fishing communities, in turn, drawing the intervention of both of the naval forces. The main complaint of Sri Lankan fishermen has been against mechanized Indian trawlers that indulge in pairs, mid-water, pelagic, and bottom trawling that end up severely damaging not only marine resources but also the sea bed. The main issue is the disproportionate growth of bottom trawlers in Tamil Nadu. Straying of fishermen also takes place inadvertently due to the ignorance of imaginary marine boundaries, engine failure or even due to sudden turbulence at sea. But, to be fair to Sri Lanka, not all Indian fishermen who stray into Sri Lankan waters are arrested or shot.

Appreciably, both the governments seem to have been working on the issues relating to straying fishermen through a Joint Working Group on Fisheries that was constituted in November 2004. Interestingly also the governments have agreed to encourage a continued dialogue process between the fishermen communities of the two countries through regular meetings. In addition to this, India and Sri Lanka have ‘agreed to put in place practical arrangements to deal with bonafide Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL)’ like no firing on Indian fishing vessels and carrying of valid registration/permit for Indian fishing vessels. Both governments have indicated moves to establish a mechanism to enable early release of fishermen, especially those from Tamil Nadu who inadvertently enter Sri Lankan waters. Despite the existence of these mechanisms and understandings at the government level, it is surprising that the issue continues to remain intractable.

China Factor: China has emerged as one of the important factors in India-Sri Lanka relations. Sri Lanka is seen as ‘an important hub on the Maritime Silk Road’ by China. Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka ranges from infrastructure development, economic aid, oil exploration, investments, trade, and a strong diplomatic support to the Island state when in need, especially in the wake of human rights accountability issues that emerged after the end of ‘Eelam War IV’. Infrastructure development having wider strategic ramifications is the main Chinese footprint in Sri Lanka that has attracted considerable attention from India. Some of the important infrastructure projects developed by China in the Island state include the Hambantota port, Katunayake-Colombo Expressway, the Norochcholai Coal Power Project, Maththala Airport, Colombo South Harbour Expansion Project, 661-room Shangri La hotel and the Centre for Performing Arts in Colombo. Statistically speaking, funding from China accounts for more than half of Sri Lanka’s construction and development loans. In value terms, it is estimated at over USD six billion—more than any other country.

Although India’s presence in reconstruction of post-war Sri Lanka is huge, China’s involvement is also notable. As far as economic engagement is concerned, the volume of trade between China and Sri Lanka is to the tune of USD four  billion. The balance of trade is hugely in favour of China. Yet, Sri Lankans are not complaining. During ‘Eelam War IV’, China liberally supplied requisite arms and ammunition to Sri Lankan troops to defeat the LTTE. Sri Lanka justified the arms procurement from China on two counts: lack of option and price worthy. These fetched China tremendous goodwill from the Sri Lankan Government and the Sinhalese in general. On the other hand, India insisted on providing only ‘non-lethal weapons’ to Colombo during the war considering domestic political implications, especially from Tamil Nadu.

What the Sri Lankans appreciate more is China’s diplomatic support to Colombo against the West-led call for international investigations on war crimes committed during ‘Eelam War IV’. There is no free lunch, however. Colombo does not seem to mind giving more leeway to Beijing in the Island to strengthen its economy. Colombo tries its best to do the fine balancing act to keep both the big powers of Asia in good humour, while at the same time benefitting from both. Sri Lanka knows well that China will never demand an addressal of  the grievances of Sri Lankan minorities through a reasonable negotiated political settlement, and will not place restrictions on the involvement of any other country in the Island in any manner. Beijing’s interests in Sri Lanka are purely strategic and, to some extent, commercial. India is not panicky about China’s footprint in Sri Lanka, but concerned about the strategic implications. The main concern is the possibility of the use of infrastructure put in place by China against Indian interests.

Despite differences from time-to-time, ties between India and Sri Lanka have never been bad to a level of becoming confrontational. Both countries have strived to remove those irritants that have come in the way of maintaining cordial ties. Nehru’s mature handling of diplomacy in the initial years, personal rapport among the political leadership in the 1960s and 1970s, disappearance of irritants on the ethnic issue in the 1990s, and emergence of strong economic interactions and people-to-people contacts in 2000s were the dominant factors that salvaged relations from turning hostile.

In resolving Sri Lanka’s ethnic issue India’s role is important. India has to exercise maximum leverage on Sri Lanka to deliver a meaningful devolution package to the minorities. Any meaningful devolution should go beyond the present 13th Amendment framework. A suitable reconciliation method could be adopted to construct bridges among all the communities of the Island. A broad and inclusive approach is required to go from conflict to coexistence and to establish sustainable peace.

It is important to de-politicize the fishermen issue by the concerned provincial governments. Solutions do not lie in electoral politics, but in handling issues in a statesman-like manner. As and when reconciliation on this front takes place, a significant chunk of the issue is taken care of. If the fishermen issue is not approached holistically, the marine frontiers between India and Sri Lanka will remain troubled. It is better if the waters between India and Sri Lanka are seen as common heritage than a contested territory.

On the China factor, India has been dealing with the issue in a subtle manner. New Delhi has to understand its strengths and weaknesses when it comes to its role in a third country on development. It should strive to have an edge on whichever fields it can. Resettlement, tourism, cultural exchange, and trade are a few areas in which India has a distinct advantage over other countries. What is more important is to positively exploit the aspect of proximity. New Delhi should consciously build constituencies in the neighbourhood and have dialogue with the concerned political, economic, social and cultural actors.

 

N Manoharan is Director, Centre for East Asian Studies, Christ University, Bengaluru.