The volume is an invaluable collection theoretically bound together with a thoughtful Introduction and a concluding chapter that generalizes the findings of the cross national research. It attends to one of the fiercely debated questions in security establishments and amongst strategic thinkers across the world as to who should police insurgencies, even extremism/terrorism—police, specialized forces, or the Army. The volume brings together ten case studies—the Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines, the Malayan Emergency 1948-60, the Mau Mau Emergency, 1952-60, in Kenya, Northern Ireland insurgency, the Colombian insurgency, the insurgency in Pakistan, Afghanistan 2002-11, Iraq 2003-6, the Sikh militancy and the Maoist insurgency in India—through which the authors bring out experiences of taming insurgencies and extremism using the police with innovative strategies. The bottomline indeed is innovation with the use of local resources and appropriate training for the police and their relations with the local community in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.
October 2014, volume 38, No 10