In this 75th year of the existence of India as an independent state, the month of May brought on a cruel heatwave. Indians are accustomed to the difficult life, and heat has been, for large swathes of the country, a permanent fixture on the list of cruelties. Yet, no matter what methods we have devised to stave it off, the experience simply worsens by the year because of human induced climate change, and all methods fail to give respite. The most marginalized are always the worst off, for whom bouts of consistently increasing temperature are not about suffering some additional discomfort but could well be the difference between life and death. It could also mean health conditions, additional financial burdens, and complete loss of productivity and livelihood.
The heat, floods, and other extreme weather events that have been increasing in intensity, frequency and unpredictability, causing untold damage are a sobering reminder that the task of the Republic with regard to a complex challenge like climate change is only just beginning. As this issue goes to press, research released by the Azim Premji University shows that between 1999 and 2019, 895 questions were raised in the Parliament on climate change and associated issues and constitute 0.3% of the total questions asked. It highlights one parameter of a low level of democratic engagement with the issue. It would be unfair to surmise anything on a single indicator alone; a more nuanced discussion is in order.
India’s engagement with climate change is not as old as the Republic itself. In 1947, environment barely figured on the global political terrain, and the term climate change was not in use. As is now common knowledge though, 1972 was a watershed year, when the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave a compelling argument prioritizing the right to development of postcolonial states at the Stockholm Conference. This was essentially a position to ensure that India was not pressured into ceding its claims on carbon space, necessary for the objectives of growth at the time. The tone was set for India’s diplomatic engagements on the issue and was carried forward to the Rio Conference in 1992, when India joined the climate change global debate in earnest.
The principle of equity, as enshrined in ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibility and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDRRC) remained the anchor for India’s official position on climate change. Though articulated earlier in reports released by the influential research and advocacy group, the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), the principle was formalized in the text of the UNFCCC. The evidence backed up this principle. Historically, maximum carbon space has been used up by the advanced countries of the west, with colonialism playing a huge role in the run up to high intensity trade, and then later the Industrial Revolution. As far as the cause of the problem goes, countries like India, impoverished by colonial rule, could not possibly have, and did not contribute. Therefore, it was only logical that so far as a collective solution was concerned, differentiating this was key. The same applied to capability of dealing with the issue. Affluent states were better placed to find a range of solutions to the problem and implement them because they had higher capacity than countries like India. Subsequently, India participated in shaping several international legal instruments, which eventually evolved into the Kyoto Protocol. The placement of countries in different lists, i.e., Annex I and Non-Annex I, reflected a continuation of the CBDRRC, since Non-Annex I countries were not placed under binding commitment targets for emissions reduction. This principle segued in smoothly with the foreign policy position India had taken since 1972.
While it would be far-fetched to describe our position as recalcitrant, there is a definite consensus among scholars of climate politics and diplomacy that till around 2007-08, India’s position was defensive, and rightly so. The issue of sovereignty was crucial, especially in a negotiation where the possibility of fixed targets could unfavourably impact the country’s longstanding goal of growth and development. India was also at this point joining ranks over this particular issue with the G-77. Around this period though, several changes occurred, and this led to some shifts in the country’s position. India was experiencing high rates of growth and along with China, Brazil and South Africa, was no longer labelled as a developing economy but as an emerging economy. This opened a window to expect India to take greater responsibility. India released the National Action Plan for Climate Change, the first and most high-profile document of its kind. Statements indicating that India was in favour of developing countries considering voluntary targets emerged both at negotiations forum and famously, by India’s then Minister for Environment, Jairam Ramesh. Public pronouncement by the Minister was domestically criticized for having smashed the carefully developed international position practically overnight. India later drew back on this position. However, the idea had now been legitimized and subsequent parlays downplayed the equity principle.
By the time the Paris Agreement of 2015 was rolled in, India had made three important pledges related to clean energy capacity, reduction in intensity of economy to 2005 levels and creating further carbon sinks—i.e., reforestation. But perhaps, the singular most important development was the push for the International Solar Alliance. Either way, it is now clear that the negotiating position has greatly evolved. India has made a clear move from being more defensive to becoming more pro-active.
One of the most commonly understood reasons for these shifts in climate negotiation positions has been linked to India’s overall foreign policy objectives. Since the start of the century, it was clear that India was rethinking its older guiding principle of nonalignment. There was a definitive tilt towards the US. Over changes in government at home, this trajectory in foreign policy not just found roots, but additionally, India was now looking for a greater role in influencing world affairs. The initiatives taken in climate policy have to be seen in this light.
It is clear that great strides have been made so far as the foreign policy dimensions of climate change are concerned. However, reading this story is also one of reckoning with a strange disconnect. It involves very little discussion of how a variety of domestic constituencies in India are engaging, or not, with climate change. One conclusion that several foreign policy commentators have drawn is that our climate politics agenda is driven solely by foreign policy. While that may be true to a large extent, a more nuanced understanding reveals that it would be inaccurate to discount the domestic story altogether. It would be fair to surmise that there is no massive, visible upsurge among the general population of the country on account of climate change. However, environmental social movements around locally pertinent resource issues do touch upon matters of climate change. In urban areas, in select pockets, younger activists simulated a School Climate Strike heeding a call from the worldwide strike called by Greta Thunberg. While it was good for optics, it did not acquire momentum and remains more of a token protest. In a few instances though, public protests by young activists were met with state repression. To expect a unified movement in a vast and variegated country like ours is to ask for the impossible. The issues themselves remain impacted by class, caste, gender, and rural-urban divides. It is highly unlikely that in the near future, climate change or associated issues that can be easily identified by the general public will become crucial enough for a strong demand to emerge to make elected representatives accountable for tackling the matter. Data from a CSDS-Lokniti Survey provide some telling glimpses. In the November-December 2019 Governance in Delhi Survey, 45% of the people surveyed identified pollution as the biggest problem in Delhi. In the same survey, only 10% saw it as an important voting issue. An important issue then may not be the same as a voting issue. This lends credence to the argument that climate policy is mostly a foreign policy issue, and domestic pressure is not a driver.
However, a large number of domestic actors and institutions, though not necessarily grassroots level, still play a role in influencing and engaging with climate change related issues that criss cross the domestic and the international. For one, domestic energy requirements are deeply intertwined with positions that India takes. At the COP26 in Glasgow, India pushed for changing the language on coal dependence from ‘phase out’ to ‘phase down’. In April this year, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman expressed concern that the war in Ukraine is likely to interrupt India’s plan for transition from coal due to the rise in cost of natural gas. Though India’s overall goal of encouraging clean energy will not change, extraordinary circumstances on the ground may definitely pose challenges. Secondly, while the general public is not heavily involved in climate-related decision making, several non-governmental organizations articulated both concerns, opposition, criticism as well as programmes for action. Third, the government did take into account the clear interest of business groups in profitable projects under the Clean Development Mechanism of the UNFCCC when it created a National Clean Development Mechanism Authority in 2004. Even now, greening and profitability going together simultaneously are a compelling pitch for business. Significantly, the institutional architecture involved in decision making on climate related issues has become far more complex, interlinked and expanded at the national level. Further, state and city-level climate action plans are being formulated. These are early days yet, but these domestic processes must be taken into account even as we acknowledge that foreign policy retains pride of place as the driver for climate policy.
This article presents a bird’s eye view of a complicated issue where there are no easy solutions and no easy politics. India at 75 may have started slow but has picked up pace on this matter, and on the whole, steered itself with finesse. The macro picture presented here must still be viewed through the lens of the worst sufferers, the ordinary people of India, the most destitute and impoverished among them. The gains from foreign policy successes, one can only hope, will be translated into a better deal and a more dignified life for those who matter most for a republic—the people.
*The author would like to thank Mohammad Imtiyaz for research assistance.
Sucharita Sengupta is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.
