In the context of war, it is famously said: ‘If you win, you need not have to explain. If you lose, you should not be there to explain!’ But Sri Lanka’s first ever Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda ‘explains’ Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE in The Turning Point: The Naval Role in Sri Lanka’s War on LTTE Terrorism. Written in first person, the author claims that the ‘book is not just a recounting of historical events; it is a testament to the resilience of the human spirit and the power of collective action.’
The LTTE was ruthless on land, sea and even in air. Breaking their strength using their style of innovation and improvization was crucial for the Sri Lankan forces. It was unimaginable to counter the Tigers without an effective maritime force. This was due to the fact that most of the supplies for the LTTE were coming through the sea—the ‘oxygen’ the LTTE was breathing. The Sri Lankan Navy’s (SLN) transformation from ‘brown water’ to ‘blue water’ navy was due to the necessity to cut supply lines, especially destruction of floating warehouses of the LTTE. This was the ‘turning point’ of the Eelam war. The small boat concept adopted by SLN tipped the balance in favour of the Sri Lankan military. In sum, SLN under Admiral Wasantha was adopting Sun Tzu’s maxim: ‘Attack is the secret of defense. Defense is the planning of an attack.’
But, to get there, the author, as the navy’s first ever chief appointed from an area command, had to do a lot to improve the navy in every sphere. He points out certain weak areas when he took over as the SLN Chief: absence of basic facilities, uniforms, accommodation, insufficient fighting capabilities, lack of leadership and confidence in the senior officers on the part of junior officers and sailors, and so on. Corruption in defence deals and political pressures were highlighted. The author has to be appreciated for his candid observations. But there is a thin line between candidness and boastfulness. It is also important to hold certain information forever keeping in mind the national interest and image of the country.
The book is very informative and undoubtedly acts as a primary source for those who wish to work on the Sri Lankan Navy. Insights of naval operations during the ceasefire period and war are well captured. Photos and maps add good value to the researchers. However, certain facts need recheck and some assertions can be questioned. For instance, one is not sure about what he means by the following statements (p. 109):
‘India flexed its muscle against Pakistan thrice and once against China on disputed territory.’
India ‘imposed a virtual blockade on landlocked Nepal over a religious dispute.’
India ‘stage-managed a terrorist takeover of the Maldives Islands with the Sri Lankan militant group and used its troops to liberate Maldives.’
It is also surprising to note the following wordings from a person of such profile:
‘Two decades after independence, a few extremist Tamil politicians started demanding a separate state, a Tamil Eelam even though they knew very well that the Sinhalese were not discriminating against Tamil but merely rectifying an injustice that Sinhalese endured under the British rule for nearly eighty years’ (p. 104). Was he justifying the majoritarian ethnic violence?
The Tamil militant ‘groups were mostly made up of uneducated youth from lower castes who joined these movements to gain recognition and a status that they did not enjoy otherwise, being born into lower caste families’ (pp. 104-5). Apart from factuality, this sounds too castiest a remark!
‘Indian intelligence agencies had been waging a secret war in Sri Lanka since the early 1980s—India agents covertly recruited Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, trained them in intelligence gathering in New Delhi and Bombay, and directed them to spy on foreign naval movements in the Trinco harbour and security forces installations in the northeastern part of Sri Lanka.’ This is far from the truth.
Editors or reviewers of the manuscript could have moderated these words.
The author touches on the fishermen’s issue as well. The author wishes the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) had ‘prevented the Indian trawlers from crossing the maritime boundary…. But they turned a blind eye to the issue probably on the instructions of the central government and allowed the TN trawlers to cross the maritime boundary.’ The issue is more complex than what the author perceives. And it is certainly not true that the ICG ‘turns a blind eye’ to the Indian fishermen.
The author claims that ‘if the damage caused to Sri Lanka due to India’s support for the LTTE in the 1980s is put into perspective a rough estimate of the cost of the destruction caused by the LTTE over a period of thirty years could be estimated to be more than US$ 400 bn.’ ‘If India had not helped the LTTE initially and not fostered separatist terrorism in Sri Lanka, all these resources could have been directed towards ensuring the economic prosperity of Sri Lanka’ (p. 119). These are baseless claims completely sidestepping huge financial aid given by India all along. Looks like the onus of Tamil militancy led by the LTTE is squarely placed on India and Sri Lanka had nothing to do with it!
According to the author, ‘The present “quad” grouping (made up of USA, Japan, India and Australia, against China), can affect Sri Lanka because of its geographical position in the centre of the Indian Ocean’ (pp. 119-120). This is once again amusing and the author’s bias is conspicuous. Most importantly, the role of India in general and the Indian Navy in particular has not been given due credit in Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE. At the least, anti-India aspersions could have been avoided.
N Manoharan is Professor and Director, Centre for East Asian Studies, CHRIST University, Bengaluru.