The trajectories of India and Afghanistan’s evolution have been vastly different since the Independence of the former in 1947.
India has remained democratic despite challenges through the decades since Independence. It has made economic, scientific and technical progress. Its society reforming though social transformation is a continuing project. It is still to fully achieve the high objectives set forth by the leaders of the Indian freedom movement which are embodied in its Constitution, but it is now recognized as a major power.
On the other hand, destiny has been cruel to Afghanistan over these decades. It has witnessed conflict and war which also involved two superpowers. The overthrow of its traditional monarchical system in 1973 led to over five decades of violent turbulence bringing in its wake instability and suffering. During this long period a nationalist five-year long Republican government gave way to eleven-years of Communist regimes supported by the Soviet Union. That, in turn, led to three years of another Soviet supported nationalist regime followed by the fragmentation of the polity under the Mujahideen. That gave way to the capture of almost all of Afghanistan by the end of the 1990s by the Taliban who had taken Kabul in 1996. They were forced to retreat to Pakistan in 2001 after America’s intervention following 9/11. The Afghan Republic established after the departure of the Taliban lasted for two decades but could not sustain itself despite foreign, mainly Western support. The Americans tired of the ‘forever’ war accepted strategic defeat at the hands of the Taliban-Pakistan combine and left in disarray in August 2021.
The Taliban now have the entire country under their control. They wish to pursue the puritanical goals set out in their interpretation of Islam, though more pragmatically than in the 1990s. The Taliban now hold a country which is economically destroyed. It is the world’s highest producer of illicit opium. Its social system has lost its moorings during this period of civil conflict, internal displacements of large populations and of millions who went into exile abroad.
Afghanistan’s troubles continue. The world would like the Taliban to follow internationally accepted human rights, especially relating to gender. It is however reconciling itself to the fact that the Taliban is unlikely to do so. Hence, it is now more and more focused on the Taliban not allowing Afghan territory to again become a safe haven for international terrorism. It is also showing increasing appetite for the resources of the Hindu Kush. These factors are leading to a gradual acceptance of the Taliban especially in the absence of a viable alternative.
The history of India-Afghan interaction shows India mainly accepting those who held power in Kabul as the rulers of the country and dealing with them as such. India also accorded them diplomatic recognition. Thus, it recognized King Zahir Shah who had ascended to the Afghan throne in 1933 till he was overthrown by his cousin Daud Khan in July 1973. Daud Khan abolished the monarchy, made Afghanistan a Republic and anointed himself as President. His moves were accepted by India. Daud was overthrown by the Communists in a bloody coup in 1978. Daud was killed along with almost all members of his family. India recognized the Communist regimes of Nur Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal and Najibullah as they came in.
Najibullah changed course, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in February 1989, to project a nationalist sentiment which was in harmony with Islam. This was an internal policy transformation and did not require new diplomatic recognition. India continued to have very close ties with Najibullah till he was overthrown by the Mujahideen in 1992. India accepted the regimes of Mojaddedi and Burhanuddin Rabbani. The latter remained in Kabul till he had to flee the capital in September 1996 when the Taliban captured it.
India opposed the Taliban who were accorded recognition only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Rabbani continued to hold the Afghan seat in the United Nations and about 10% of Afghan territory. India continued to deal with the Rabbani Government as the legitimate authority in Afghanistan and combined with Russia and Iran to give financial support to Ahmed Shah Masood and other Northern Alliance leaders. That enabled them to maintain an armed resistance to the Taliban. Masood was assassinated on May 9, 2001. Two days later Al-Qaeda carried out terrorist attacks in the US which are embedded in global memory as 9/11. That changed Afghan history.
With the support of their allies the Americans waged war against the Taliban when they refused to hand over Osama bin Ladin to them. On the ground in Afghanistan the Northern Alliance allied with the Americans. By November 2001, a combination of US bombing and Northern Alliance ground action forced the Taliban out of Kabul and soon they lost control of all Afghan territory. The reasons which led to American laxity to finish the Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan and allowing them to retreat to Pakistan are still not clear.
America led the global effort to fill the political vacuum in Afghanistan through the Bonn conference. The Afghan groups which met under American influence decided on Hamid Karzai to head an Interim Administration consisting mainly of Northern Alliance leaders. India fully supported American efforts and enthusiastically welcomed the ouster of the Taliban and the Bonn arrangement.
The Interim authority gave way to a Transitional government in June 2002. India played a role in smoothening the process of its formation. In 2003 the Transitional authority worked out a Republican Constitution and the next year a Presidential election was held under it. Hamid Karzai became the first elected President of the Republic. India supported his administration though he was initially wary of Indian intentions because of its relations with the erstwhile Northern Alliance leaders. However, it gradually became clear to him that India’s support for his government and its desire that it succeeded in consolidating its position was firm and unconditional. India wanted Afghanistan to become a stable state and work according to its Constitution. It kept away from its domestic politics while maintaining relations with the country’s various political forces which were largely based on ethnic lines. India also kept aloof on trying to advice Karzai and later, his successor, Ashraf Ghani on their external policies and actions.
From the establishment of the Interim Afghan administration India renewed its programmes of assistance for the Afghan people. India was never prescriptive while assisting another country. Not a traditional donor, it responded to the requests made to the extent possible. This was unlike the practices of traditional donors who acted according to what they thought should be the priorities of the recipient states. India shunned this approach; hence its assistance programme met the real needs of the people and became popular with them and also with the governments. This was particularly so in Afghanistan.
India’s assistance programme became especially active after establishment of the Republic after the departure of the Taliban. It was comprehensive, covering humanitarian, training, health, education, and infrastructure development sectors. These were traditional areas of Indian assistance in Afghanistan, but their scope was expanded and the pace of delivery quickened. India responded readily to send disaster assistance relief when earthquakes or floods occurred. In addition, the Indian Government decided in 2002 to send a million tons of wheat. As Pakistan would not allow their transportation through its territory the wheat was converted in India to nutritious biscuits for children and transported via Iran. The World Food Programme (WFP) was involved in this project. This was an exception because India always routed its assistance through the Afghan state. It did not adopt the NGO route. In the case of Infrastructure projects too while Indian companies undertook the job, they employed local labour and sourced materials locally also to the extent possible. Naturally, the management and experts went from India.
India built Afghanistan’s Parliament building. The author recalls Hamid Karzai calling him to a meeting to his Presidential office and telling him that his Cabinet colleagues and he felt that it would be only appropriate for India, the world’s largest democracy, to build Afghanistan’s Parliament House. India built the Zaranj-Dilaram Highway and brought electricity from across the Hindu Kush mountains to Kabul through power transmission lines. India completed the Salma Dam which was begun in the 1970s and also sustained the Indira Gandhi Hospital which it had built in Kabul. Even in the 1990s during Mullah Omar’s rule, medicines and other essentials were sent quietly to the hospital. This was done in response to the requests of the Afghan Health authorities.
India’s training programmes were conducted in India and Afghanistan. They embraced both civilian and military sectors. India also gave scholarships to Afghan students in India. However, it is regrettable that this process was discontinued after the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 2021. India’s relations are now being normalized with visas for Afghans, subject to security checks, as in the past.
Pakistan has been a constant factor in the bilateral relationship as a whole. Pakistan has almost always had a tense relationship with Kabul which had opposed its entry into the United Nations. This was because of its view that the treaties it had entered into with British India would lapse with their departure from the Indian subcontinent and Pakistan could not claim their continuance as a successor state. In particular Afghanistan did not accept the Durand Line as the international frontier between the two countries. Ultimately, it lifted its objection to Pakistan’s UN membership but still does not recognize the Durand Line as the international frontier between the two countries. Underlying this rejection is the Pashtun sentiment that they are distinct from the Punjabis who control Pakistan’s destiny.
Pakistan’s fundamental fear is being caught in an Indian-Afghan pincer. Hence, it has always hankered for a government in Kabul that would be aligned with its interests on India. Indeed, ideally it would want ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan against India even though the nature of warfare is changing, rendering the concept, as it was envisaged by Pakistan in the 1990s of little value. No Afghan government has been willing to accept Pakistan’s dictation on its foreign policy orientations. However, while wanting a cooperative relationship with India extending to the security sector also, Kabul, under any government, has always sought to ensure that it does not allow India to freely use its territory against Pakistan.
This has not prevented Pakistan from accusing successive Afghan governments of permitting its intelligence to act in tandem with its Indian counterparts to foment trouble in Pakistan through its disaffected nationals who have taken refuge in Afghanistan. These allegations were specially made during the Karzai and Ghani periods. Pakistan is unhappy with the Taliban-India normalization processes because of this reason too.
If Pakistan keeps a wary eye on Indian activities in Afghanistan, India has also had to do so. In the late 1990s there were credible reports of anti-Indian terrorist groups being trained in Afghanistan. Besides, there is little doubt that the ISI used Taliban elements to mount attacks on Indian diplomats, military officers and others during Karzai and Ghani’s period in office.
India-Afghanistan commercial ties have also been impacted by Pakistan’s not permitting Indian goods to be transported to Afghanistan via the land route from Wagah. On the other hand, they have allowed Afghan products which have generally been fresh, dry fruits and other agricultural produce to come to India. Traditionally, the Durand Line was porous for Indian goods to be smuggled into Pakistan via Afghanistan. Indian tea and truck tyres had a ready market, but Pakistan came down heavily over the past few decades and smuggling of these products has consequently reduced.
The fact is that for the past three and a half decades Pakistan has used Afghanistan as its economic colony. This has bred deep resentment among the Afghans. Along with the maltreatment of refugees this factor has alienated many Afghans even though it was only with Pakistan’s support that the Taliban was able to succeed in the ‘forever’ war and is now back in Kabul. It is noteworthy that neither the Mujahideen in the 1990s held, nor the Taliban now hold any resentment against India though it actively supported their rivals during the period of civil strife. In fact, today the Taliban wants to intensify its engagement with India and wants Indian investments. In looking to the future India has to consider innovative ways to get a share of the natural resources of the Hindu Kush. This will require concerted efforts at gaining connectivity to Afghanistan and beyond. A greater push to the Chabahar route is required. It cannot allow China to integrate Afghanistan economically into its western region.
It would not be prudent to give formal diplomatic recognition to the Taliban till it is accepted by the international community. That is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Meanwhile, India should follow its traditional policy of doing business with those in power in Kabul and not be guided by the valid exception of the 1990s. It clearly appears that the Taliban also wish to take the bilateral relationship forward.
Afghanistan was, is and will remain vital to India’s national interests.
Vivek Katju is former Indian diplomat and Ambassador to several key countries, most notably Afghanistan, Myanmar and Thailand.