Is there an Indian idea of populism? Srikrishna Ayyangar’s book, A Logic of Populism: India and its States answers this question in a novel way. It is easier to examine the Indian model by analysing one or a few case studies, but the book adopts a more rigorous and sophisticated approach. By comparing 37 cases of national and State political leadership in India spanning six decades, from Indira Gandhi’s tenure in 1971 to Narendra Modi’s term in 2024, the book presents the most extensive study of populism in India to date.
What does the book tell us about Indian populism? Ayyangar argues that the three classical approaches to populism—the ideational, the strategic and the sociocultural—can explain Indian populism in parts. However, a deductive approach that fits theories developed in Western Europe and America to understand the Indian case risks yielding false positives. In contrast, the author’s approach is more inductive, as it employs comparisons across several Indian cases to draw out a theory on the distinctive characteristics of populism in India.
What does the book find? First, the book shows that employing the existing populism model—which posits that populists are defined by ‘the people’ and subsequently identify ‘the other’—is akin to putting the cart before the horse. Ayyangar argues that in India, boundary setting occurs first: the ‘enemy’ is identified upfront, and the idea of the people is ‘capaciously’ constructed from those who do not constitute the enemy. Second, the book identifies both the demand-side theory (the innate tendency of people to be drawn to populist appeals) and the supply-side theory (where politicians fuel the divide between the people and the other). Ayyangar notes that in India’s case, populism manifests as a mix of both supply-side and demand-side pressures. While the populist sets the boundary for who constitutes the people, this boundary-construction process is situated within the life experiences of people, thereby blending both sets of expectations.
These findings mark a significant breakthrough in the study of populism in India. What makes the analysis compelling is the novel set-theory comparative analysis. As a researcher who employs quantitative methods extensively, I do (grudgingly) acknowledge the author’s resistance to excessive dependence on statistical methods to claim valid results. The qualitative approach used in the study is refreshing and introduces a new method for analysing populism. While the details of the methodology may not interest general readers, who are more likely to be concerned with the findings, political science scholars—specifically those with a keen interest in methodological innovation—will find the details enriching. I would have liked more detailed descriptions of each populist he identifies, but I understand that providing extensive descriptions may be unwieldy given the large number of cases.
Finally, the book raises two important normative questions that would stimulate more discussion around the normative implications of populism. First, whether populism, in theory, is bad for democracy because of ‘majoritarianism’, or whether it is good because it embodies the ‘people’s will’. Second, whether the consequences of populism are incontestable vices, as is usually assumed, or whether they can have beneficial effects under certain circumstances.
Ayyangar’s book presents two arguments that challenge the conventional normative analysis of populism. On the first question, his position is complicated. He enters the debate but does not take a clear stance. Populism, he says, can be a ‘good’ force because it can articulate the lived experiences of people. On the other hand, the danger of populism is that it can give rise to Manichaean (people/enemy) polarizations, sharpening distinctions between the majority and the minority. Regarding the second question on the consequences of populism, he is clearer that populism can have beneficial effects. This stance contradicts conventional democratic arguments that view populism as incongruous with democracy. Ayyangar presents a new claim that populism should be viewed as a distinct form of mobilization with the potential to enhance democratic participation.
This is an important argument, which aligns with broader shifts in the discourse on majoritarianism and democracy. In a recent article in the Journal of Democracy, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt made a case for revisiting the relationship between majoritarianism and democracy. In a departure from past writings on democracy, the two scholars acknowledge the value that an electoral majority brings to the practice of democracy and advocate for a minimalist version of counter-majoritarianism. Their argument is that counter-majoritarian protections for minorities are indispensable during the early stages of democratic transition, but after democracy consolidates, these protections should be limited to the essential. However, other scholars, such as Barry Weingast, argue that high levels of minority protection are crucial even after democratic consolidation.
Srikrishna Ayyangar’s book on populism is therefore timely and contributes to the broader discussions on populism, majoritarianism, and democracy. His distinctive contribution is that he advances a uniquely Indian perspective on populism, which diverges from the global discourse in political science on the subject. Ayyangar’s argument and novel evidence are as original as the Indian model of populism he describes.
Ajit Phadnis is Faculty Member, Humanities and Social Science Area at the Indian Institute of Management, Indore.